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The findings of researchers’ analysis of the 37 incidents of targeted school violence that were examined under the Safe School Initiative fall generally into five areas:
The findings in each of these areas are presented and explained below.
Finding
There is no accurate or useful
“profile” of students who engaged in targeted school
Explanation
Although all of the attackers
in this study were boys, there is no set of traits that described all–or
even most–of the attackers. Instead,
they varied considerably in demographic, background and other characteristics.
The attackers came from a variety
of family situations, ranging from intact families with numerous ties
to the community, to foster homes with histories of neglect.
For those incidents for which
information on the attackers’ school performance was available, that
information indicates that those attackers differed considerably from
one another in their academic achievement in school, with grades ranging
from excellent to failing (n=34).
Attackers also varied in the
types of social relationships they had established, ranging from socially
isolated to popular among their peers.
Attackers’ histories of disciplinary problems at school also varied. Some attackers had no observed behavioral problems, while others had multiple behaviors warranting reprimand and/or discipline.
Most attackers showed no marked change in academic performance
(56 percent, n=23), friendship patterns (73 percent, n=30), interest in
school (59 percent, n=24), or school disciplinary problems (68 percent,
n=28) prior to their attack.
Finding
Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted
or injured by others prior to the attack.
Explanation
Almost three-quarters of the
attackers felt persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked or injured by
others prior to the incident (71percent, n=29).[21]
In several cases, individual
attackers had experienced bullying and harassment that was long-standing
and severe. In some of these cases
the experience of being bullied seemed to have a significant impact on
the attacker and appeared to have been a factor in his decision to mount
an attack at the school.[22] In one case, most of the attacker’s schoolmates
described the attacker as “the kid everyone teased.” In witness statements from that incident,
schoolmates alleged that nearly every child in the school had at some
point thrown the attacker against a locker, tripped him in the hall, held
his head under water in the pool or thrown things at him. Several schoolmates had noted that the attacker seemed more annoyed
by, and less tolerant of, the teasing than usual in the days preceding
the attack.
A history of having been the subject of a mental health evaluation, diagnosed with a mental disorder, or involved in substance abuse did not appear to be prevalent among attackers. However, most attackers showed some history of suicidal attempts or thoughts, or a history of feeling extreme depression or desperation.
Explanation
Over half of the attackers
demonstrated some interest in violence, through movies, video
Explanation
Most attackers
had no history of prior violent or criminal behavior.
Explanation
Finding
Most attackers were known to have
had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted
suicide.
Explanation
Most attackers appeared to have difficulty coping with
losses, personal failures or other difficult circumstances.
Almost all of the attackers had experienced or perceived some major
loss prior to the attack (98 percent, n=40).
These losses included a perceived failure or loss of status (66
percent, n=27); loss of a loved one or of a significant relationship,
including a romantic relationship (51 percent, n=21); and a major illness
experienced by the attacker or someone significant to him (15 percent,
n=6). In one case, the attacker,
who was a former student at the school where the attack occurred, was
laid off from his job because he did not have a high school diploma.
The attacker blamed the job loss on the teacher who failed him
in a senior-year course, which kept him from graduating.
He returned to the school a year after leaving the school, killed
his former teacher and two students, and then held over 60 students hostage
for 10 hours.
For most attackers, their outward
behaviors suggested difficulty in coping with loss (83 percent, n=34).
For example, the mother, the brother and a friend of the attacker
who lost his job each had commented that the attacker became depressed
and withdrawn following the lay-off. The friend also reported that he knew that
the attacker blamed his former teacher for his problems and had begun
planning how to retaliate.
Finding
Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.
Explanation
Several findings of the Safe School Initiative indicate clearly
that the school-based attacks studied were rarely impulsive. Rather, these attacks typically were thought
out beforehand and involved some degree of advance planning. In many cases, the attacker’s observable
behavior prior to the attack suggested he might be planning or preparing
for a school attack.
In nearly all of the incidents
for which information concerning the attacker’s conceptualization
of the attack was available, researchers found that the attacker had developed
his idea to harm the target(s)
before the attack (95 percent, n=39).
The length of time that attackers held this idea prior to the actual
attack varied considerably. Some
attackers conceived of the attack as few as one or two days prior to advancing
that attack; other attackers had held the idea of the attack for as long
as a year prior to carrying it out. For
those incidents where information was available to determine how long
the attacker had an idea to harm the target (n=33), the analysis showed
that a little over half of the attackers developed their idea for the
incident at least a month prior to the attack (51 percent, n=17).
In addition, almost all of
the attackers planned out the
attack in advance of carrying it out (93 percent; n=38). Moreover, there was evidence from the attacker’s behavior prior to the attack that the attacker
had a plan or was preparing to harm the target(s) (93 percent, n=38).
For example, one attacker asked his friends to help him get ammunition
for one of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make it easier
to conceal beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat with his
mother; and cut the pockets out of the coat so that he could conceal the
weapon within the coat while holding the weapon through one of the cut-out
pockets. That attacker had a well-known
fascination with weapons and had told his friends on several occasions
that he thought about killing certain students at school.
The length of time between
the planning and execution of the attacks also varied considerably for
the targeted school violence incidents studied.
Some attackers developed their plans on the day of their attack
or only one or two days prior; others developed their plans between six
and eight months prior to the attack.
In cases where there was information available to establish the
date planning began (n=29), analysis of available information revealed
that most of the attackers developed a plan at least two days prior to
the attack (69 percent, n=21).
Revenge was a motive for more
than half of the attackers (61 percent, n=25). Other motives included trying to solve a problem (34 percent, n=14);
suicide or desperation (27 percent, n=11); and efforts to get attention
or recognition (24 percent, n=10). More
than half of the attackers had multiple
motives or reasons for their school-based attacks (54 percent, n=22). In addition, most of the attackers held some
sort of grievance at the time of the attack, either against their target(s)
or against someone else (81 percent, n=33).
Many attackers told other people about these grievances prior to
their attacks (66 percent, n=27).[23]
Finding
Prior to most incidents, other people
knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to attack.
Explanation
In most cases, other people
knew about the attack before it took place.
In over three-quarters of the incidents, at least one person had
information that the attacker was thinking about or planning the school
attack (81 percent, n=30). In
nearly two-thirds of the incidents, more
than one person had information about the attack before it occurred
(59 percent, n=22). In nearly
all of these cases, the person who knew was a peer–a friend, schoolmate,
or sibling (93 percent, n=28/30). Some
peers knew exactly what the attacker planned to do; others knew something
“big” or “bad” was going to happen, and in several
cases knew the time and date it was to occur. An adult had information about the idea or
plan in only two cases.
In one incident, for example,
the attacker had planned to shoot students in the lobby of his school
prior to the beginning of the school day.
He told two friends exactly what he had planned and asked three
others to meet him that morning in the mezzanine overlooking the lobby,
ostensibly so that these students would be out of harm’s way. On most mornings, usually only a few students would congregate on
the mezzanine before the school day began.
However, by the time the attacker arrived at school on the morning
of the attack, word about what was going to happen had spread to such
an extent that 24 students were on the mezzanine waiting for the attack
to begin. One student who knew the attack was to occur
brought a camera so that he could take pictures of the event.
Finding
Most attackers did not threaten
their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.
Explanation
The majority of the attackers
in the targeted school violence incidents examined under the Safe School Initiative did not threaten
their target(s) directly, i.e., did not tell the target they intended
to harm them, whether in direct, indirect or conditional language prior
to the attack. Only one-sixth of the attackers threatened
their target(s) directly prior to the attack (17 percent, n=7).
Finding
Most attackers engaged in some behavior,
prior to the incident, that caused others concern or indicated a need
for help.
Explanation
Almost all of the attackers
engaged in some behavior prior to the attack that caused others–school
officials, parents, teachers, police, fellow students–to be concerned
(93 percent, n=38). In most of
the cases, at least one adult
was concerned by the attacker’s behavior (88 percent, n=36).
In three-quarters of the cases, at least three people–adults
and other children–were concerned by the attacker’s behavior
(76 percent, n=31). In one case, for example, the attacker made
comments to at least 24 friends and classmates about his interest in killing
others kids, building bombs or carrying out an attack at the school. A school counselor was so concerned about this
student’s behavior that the counselor asked to contact the attacker’s
parents. The attacker’s parents
also knew of his interest in guns.
The behaviors that led other individuals to be concerned about the attacker included both behaviors specifically related to the attack, such as efforts to get a gun, as well as other disturbing behaviors not related to the subsequent attack. In one case, the student’s English teacher became concerned about several poems and essays that the student submitted for class assignments because they treated the themes of homicide and suicide as possible solutions to his feelings of despair. In another case, the student worried his friends by talking frequently about plans to put rat poison in the cheese shakers at a popular pizza establishment. A friend of that student became so concerned that the student was going to carry out the rat poison plan, that the friend got out of bed late one night and left his house in search of his mother, who was not home at the time, to ask her what to do.
Finding
In many cases, other students
were involved in the attack in some capacity.
Explanation
Although most attackers carried
out their attacks on their own, many attackers were influenced or encouraged
by others to engage in the attacks. Nearly
half of the attackers were influenced by other individuals in deciding
to mount an attack, dared or encouraged by others to attack, or both (44
percent; n=18). For example, one
attacker’s original idea had been to bring a gun to school and let
other students see him with it. He
wanted to look tough so that the students who had been harassing him would
leave him alone. When he shared
this idea with two friends, however, they convinced him that exhibiting
the gun would not be sufficient and that he would have to shoot
at people at the school in order to get the other students to leave
him alone. It was after this conversation
that this student decided to mount his school attack.
In other cases, friends assisted
the attacker in his efforts to acquire a weapon or ammunition, discussed
tactics for getting a weapon into school undetected, or helped gather
information about the whereabouts of a target at a particular time during
the school day.
Finding
Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
Explanation
Experience using weapons and
access to them was common for many attackers. Nearly two-thirds of the
attackers had a known history of weapons use, including knives, guns and
bombs (63 percent, n=26). Over
half of the attackers had some experience specifically with a gun prior
to the incident (59 percent, n=24), while others had experience with bombs
or explosives (15 percent, n=6). However,
fewer than half of the attackers demonstrated any fascination or excessive
interest with weapons (44 percent, n=18), and less than one-third showed
a fascination with explosives (32 percent, n=13) prior to their attacks. Over two-thirds of the attackers acquired the gun (or guns) used
in their attacks from their own home or that of a relative (68 percent,
n=28).
Finding
Despite prompt law enforcement
responses, most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement
intervention.
Explanation
Most school-based attacks were stopped through intervention by school administrators, educators and students-or by the attacker stopping on his own. In about one-third of the incidents, the attacker was apprehended by or surrendered to administrators, faculty, or school staff (27 percent, n=10) or to students (5 percent, n=2). In just over one-fifth of the incidents, the attacker stopped on his own or left the school (22 percent, n=8). In a few incidents, the attacker killed himself during the course of the incident (13 percent, n=5).
Just over one-quarter of the incidents were stopped through law enforcement intervention (27 percent, n=10). Law enforcement personnel discharged weapons in only three of the incidents of targeted school violence studied (8 percent, n=3).
Close to half of the incidents
were known to last 15 minutes or less from the beginning of the shooting
to the time the attacker was apprehended, surrendered or stopped shooting
(47 percent, n=16).[24] One-quarter of the incidents were over within
five minutes of their inception (27 percent, n=9). The fact that it was not through law enforcement
intervention that most of the targeted school violence incidents studied
were stopped appears in large part to be a function of how brief most
of these incidents were in duration.
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